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ABSTRACT  
Assessing the Impact of Factional Infighting within Boko Haram 
By: Paul Markos 
Under the direction of Dr. Mark Chen 
 
The emergence of Boko Haram in West Africa has resulted in severe disruption of the Lake 
Chad region and the displacement of millions. In 2015, Boko Haram pledged allegiance to ISIS, 
signaling a shift in the organization’s objectives and adopting a new strategy for influence over 
its region. Subsequent leadership changes led to the group’s splintering into multiple factions. 
Infighting between and within factions has raised new questions imperative to understanding the 
group’s outlook. This paper sought to examine the impact that deaths of ISIS and ISWAP leaders 
have on the outlook of Boko Haram and its factions (JAS, Ansaru, ISWAP) and to anticipate the 
group’s potential next actions and aggressions. Data consisting of open source intelligence was 
compiled and analyzed. Based on this analysis, the report establishes that the Islamic State West 
Africa Province faction presents the greatest threat to Nigeria, due to its ability to gain popular 
support from civilians in the region. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi’s death provides a path for the 
possible re-emergence of al-Qaeda in Nigeria. It has also led to a hardline turn of events within 
ISWAP that will likely fuel an uptick in soft and hard target attacks across West Africa. By 
elucidating the driving factors behind the threat of increased insurgency, the analysis provided 
can be used as a roadmap to anticipate and deter Boko Haram’s hand in West African affairs.  
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Glossary 
 
Allah: An Arabic word referring to the Islamic God.  
 
Apostasy: Not believing in the essential tenets of Islam.  
 
Al-Hayat: Referring to the media wing of Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant  
 
Caliph: A person considered a politico-religious successor to the Islamic prophet Muhammed 
and a leader of the entire ummah. 
 
Caliphate: An Islamic state under the leadership of an Islamic steward with the title of caliph.  
 
Cleric: A priest or religious leader. 
 
Imam: The person who leads prayers in a mosque. 
 
Infidels: A person who does not believe in religion or who adheres to a religion other than one’s 
own.  
 
Jama’atu Ahlis-Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad: English translation means People Committed 
to the Prophets Teachings for Propagation and Jihad. 
 
Jihad: A struggle or fight against the enemies of Islam.  
 
Lake Chad: Large lake in Africa, which connects Chad, Cameroon, Niger, and Nigeria. 
 
Mujahideen: A guerrilla fighter in Islamic countries, especially those who are fighting against 
non-Muslim forces. 
 
Quran: The Islamic sacred book. 
 
Shaykh: An Arab leader, particularly the head of chief of a tribe, village, or group. 
 
Sharia: Islamic religious law forming part of Islamic tradition and derived from Islam.  
 
Shura council: A consultative council.  
 
Takfir: The action or practice of declaring that a fellow Muslim is guilty of apostasy and 
therefore no longer a Muslim.  
 
Ummah: The whole community of Muslims bound together by ties of religion. 
 
Wali: The Arabic word refers to someone who is the authority.  
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List of Abbreviations 
AFRICOM: United States Africa Command 
AQ: al-Qaeda 
AQIM: al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb 
CT: Counter-Terrorism 
IDP: Internally Displaced Persons 
IED: Improvised Explosive Device 
IS: Islamic State 
ISGS: Islamic State in the Greater Sahara 
ISIS: Islamic State in Iraq and Syria 
ISR: Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance  
ISWA: Islamic State West Africa 
ISWAP: Islamic State West Africa Province 
JAS: Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad 
K&R: Kidnap and Ransom 
MNJTF: Multinational Joint Task Force 
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Research Questions 
  
Primary:  
● What is the current and future impact of factional infighting within Boko Haram? 
 
Secondary: 
● How has Abubakar Shekau’s ejection from Islamic State West Africa sculpted Boko 
Haram’s new outlook? 
● What effect does Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi’s death have on Islamic State West Africa? 
● How does Jama’tu Ahlis Sunna compare with Islamic State West Africa in terms of 
civilian appeal? 
● To what extent has al-Qaeda/ISIS played a role in fueling Boko Haram? 
● To what extent have underlying internal systemic issues played a role in fueling Boko 
Haram? 
● How does the internal execution of Abu Abdullah Umar al-Barnawi change ISWAP’s 
goals? 
● Does the organizational structure of Boko Haram allow fortified network resiliency? 
● What are the indicators that will suggest what future direction Boko Haram is moving? 
● How can Nigeria increase counter-terrorism efforts beyond military force? 
● What policy is the US currently taking with respect to combating Boko Haram? 
● What can the United States gain from the terrorist infighting, and what does it risk? 
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Methodology 
The main method of research used in this work was qualitative analysis of primary and 
secondary sources. These sources include scholarly works, journal articles, books, cyber-news 
articles, audio recordings, correspondence, speeches, and relevant social media content. Maps 
were used to detail and examine previous Boko Haram attacks and clashes throughout the Lake 
Chad Basin. The data was then used to understand where Boko Haram strongholds are and 
predict where they will likely be in the future, which was dependent on Structured Analytical 
Techniques.   
Structured Analytical Techniques were employed to enhance the accuracy of analytical 
predictions and counter any unanticipated biases. In terms of combating bias, an analysis of 
competing hypotheses was used to aid in ensuring any future analysis was not in excessive 
confidence.  “What if?” analysis was relied upon heavily since this topic centers around an 
emerging threat and what early indicators could help create awareness of change taking place.  
Finally, multiple scenarios analysis was used to demonstrate the many possible outcomes 
that could manifest in the future and to demonstrate to readers the significance of each potential 
outcome, even if it is unlikely. 
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Research Limitations 
 
A heavy portion of this paper is counter-terrorism analysis. The restriction of only being 
able to access unclassified, open source information heavily limits analysis when dealing with 
the dynamic threat of a terrorist organization. Furthermore, contradicting reports surface 
regularly on the internet. The fact that a large percentage of reports and research performed on 
this subject have originated in the United States, while addressing topics in Africa, leaves 
ambiguity in interpreting information, and at times this forced self-interpretation of whether a 
source was deemed credible or not. In response to this, many accounts have been cross-vetted 
and cited by multiple sources. Lastly, cognitive biases remain pertinent in research that involves 
any form of personal analytical interpretation. Although objective Structured Analytical 
Techniques were employed to censor the level of bias that seeped into the work, it is inevitable 
that some remains. Confirmation bias, anchoring effect, and overconfidence can also impact 
analysis of any intelligence data.  
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Assessing the Impact of Factional Infighting within Boko Haram 
Chapter 1: Introduction  
Since 2009, the terrorist group referred to as Boko Haram has devastated the Lake Chad 
region within West Africa, primarily in Northeast Nigeria’s Borno State. Murder of thousands, 
kidnappings, bombings, and displacement of millions have become an incessant result of conflict 
due to Boko Haram’s viscous campaign. For more than a decade now, the group has tormented 
the people of West Africa. 2014 was the deadliest year for Boko Haram attacks and included the 
widely known kidnapping of 276 Dapchi schoolgirls from Chibok.1 Following this, 2015 served 
as the beginning of a large factional split within the terror group that proved to be monumental in 
the continuation of Boko Haram as it previously existed.2 As 2015’s events transformed into 
modern day 2020, these factional splits have brought about new implications and resulted in 
opportunities for both the terrorist group and counter-terrorism forces. The question has been 
posed to assess the limitations of Boko Haram and its many factions as an expansive terrorist 
organization and to assess the level of counter methods necessary to expel the group from the 
region. 
As of the date of this study, Boko Haram is primarily split into two main factions that 
continue to drive insurgent campaigns and remain enduring threats to the region: Jama’tu Ahlis 
Sunna Lidda’awati wal-jihad (JAS), led by Abubakar Shekau, and the adversarial Islamic State 
West Africa Province (ISWAP), which has seen multiple leadership changes since the time of  
since Shekau’s ejection in 2016. The third faction, Ansaru, translating to “The Vanguards for the 
Protection of Muslims in Black Africa,” originated from Boko Haram, but has since distanced 
                                                
1 Mapping Militant Organizations. “Global Islamic State.” (2019). Stanford University. 
https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/mappingmilitants/profiles/boko-haram#text_block_19380 
2 Callimachi, Rukmini. (2015). “Boko Haram generates uncertainty With Pledge of Allegiance to Islamic State.” The 
New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/08/world/africa/boko-haram-is-said-to-pledge-allegiance-to-
islamic-state.html 
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itself from the rest of the group, blurring the lines that separate the three current day jihadist 
networks.3 Ansaru has been primarily dormant in recent years in terms of offensives, having not 
claimed an attack since 2013 with the exception of the January 2020 attack on the Emir of 
Potiskum, Yobe State.4 Instead, the group has focused its efforts on spreading propaganda across 
West Africa and continuing conversations with factions of al-Qaeda across the continent. 
The aim of this thesis is to characterize Boko Haram as a continuing high-level terrorist 
organization that has the potential to evolve parts of Africa into a Caliphate for the Islamic State 
movement. Throughout this paper, I will seek to explore how Boko Haram’s 2015 pledge of 
allegiance to ISIS, followed by the factional split between JAS and ISWAP in 2016, has 
impacted both factions’ grasp on the region and changed the nature of the threat that Boko 
Haram formerly presented. I will also address major factors that are likely to predict how Islamic 
jihad will torment the region in the future. The most notable of these includes the marriage of the 
Islamic State and Boko Haram, the death of ISIS caliph Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, increased recent 
activity by Ansaru, and the execution of the most recent Islamic State West Africa leader, 
Abdullah Ibn Umar al-barnawi. The review of the literature will provide background and lay the 
foundation for explaining how Islamic State in West Africa presents a much more serious long-
term threat than its sister faction, Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna. In short, I will argue that ISWA has 
taken a far more holistic approach that consists of strong financial backing, a long-term vision 
with attainable short-term goals, a crucial ability to appease to the local civilian populace, and 
other characteristics that mirror the tactics once employed by ISIS in Iraq and Syria. This 
contrasts from the primary objective of Jama’atu ahlis Sunna, which is to gain a foothold in 
                                                
3 Barkindo, Atta. (2016). “Understanding Boko Haram’s Factional Structure.” Research Gate. 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/303685572_Understanding_Boko_Haram's_Factional_Structure 
4 Weiss, Caleb. (2020). “Ansaru Publicly Returns to Nigeria.” Long War Journal. 
https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2020/01/ansaru-publicly-returns-to-nigeria.php 
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Nigeria’s Northeastern Borno State through focused aggression and genocidal ventures that lack 
the ability to appeal strategically to the masses, sound financial backing, and much needed 
technological advancements.5 My belief differs from the prevailing opinion, which holds that 
alliance between ISIS and ISWAP is little more than superficial propaganda.6 
Prior to addressing these questions, it is vital that one understands the origins of Boko 
Haram, how the group has evolved, and the source of the group’s motivation. Understanding 
these fundamentals principles provides the knowledge necessary to make accurate analytical 
predictions. It also gives insight into the warning signs of a new group backed by ISIS or al-
Qaeda surfacing in the area and creates a tactical roadmap that Nigerian politicians, police, and 
military can employ to effectively shorten the longevity of Boko Haram.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                
5 Hinshaw, Drew and Parkinson, Joe. (2019). “Islamic State, Seeking Next Chapter, Makes Inroads Through West 
Africa.” The Wall Street Journal. https://www.wsj.com/articles/islamic-state-seeking-next-chapter-makes-inroads-
through-west-africa-11549220824 
6 Tisdall, Simon. (2015). “Boko Haram-Isis alliance is nothing but superficial propaganda.” The Guardian. 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/mar/08/boko-haram-isis-alliance-is-nothing-but-superficial-propaganda 
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I. Geographic Perspective  
The majority of fighting that will be discussed in this paper takes place in Northeastern Nigeria’s 
Borno State. When comparing Borno State to its surrounding territory of Nigeria, Niger, Chad, 
and Cameroon, it seems rather small, so when hearing reports of attacks repeatedly happening in 
the same vicinity, it is easy to confuse how groups, villagers, and security forces are not stacked 
on top of each other.  Thus, it is important to be able to contextualize the territories where 
Islamic State West Africa and Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad members are 
roaming, fighting, and growing influence.  
                        West Virginia                                      Nigeria’s Borno State   
          
Figure 1. The images above were sourced from Google Maps. West Virginia (62,755 km2), 
pictured outlined in red on the left, is slightly smaller than the size of Borno State (70,898 km2), 
seen outlined in red on the right. Importantly, the terrain of Borno State is rocky and hilly in 
some places, dense with the Sambisa Forest in others, and meandering, rigid road structures 
serve elsewhere. This diverse topography allows Boko Haram ample space to set up multiple 
camps that are difficult to spot and even harder to combat.  
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II. History 
The origins of Boko Haram trace deep into the history of Nigeria’s Borno State. Many 
scholars, like Kim Searcy, professor of Islam and African history, tie 19th century Islamic 
reformation in West Africa and the British colonial presence in Africa, particularly in Nigeria, as 
monumental events that sculpted Nigeria into the religious and ethnic battlegrounds necessary 
for the foundation upon which Boko Haram was built.7 These events led to deep marginalization 
of the Kinuri people, the ethnic group dominant in Borno State. The Kinuri people reside mostly 
in the Lake Chad region, lands that were previously home to the Kanem and Bornu Empires of 
their ancestors. It is estimated that only about eight percent of Nigeria’s population is Kinuri, yet 
the overwhelming majority of Boko Haram fighters come from this ethnic group.8 Although 
these historical conditions paved the road to the events that take place today, systemic local 
political, religious, and economic factors in Nigeria also provided the necessary fertile soil in 
which the destructive organization could grow.9  
Many scholars are divided on which factors contributed most to the creation of Boko 
Haram. Some see the local systemic issues as the primary impetus for the group's creation. 
Others see the role of international jihadi organizations like al-Qaeda as the main instigators. 
Both beliefs undoubtedly play a role in the creation and expansion of Boko Haram. The local 
factors created the physical landscape and political environment for a terrorist group to exploit 
while the psychological impact of international jihadi organizations and propaganda instilled 
                                                
7 Searcy, Kim. (2016). “All Politics is Local: Understanding Boko Haram.” Origins.osu.edu. 
http://origins.osu.edu/article/all-politics-local-understanding-boko-haram 
8 Asfura-Heim, Patricio and McQuaid, Julia. (2015). “Diagnosing the Boko Haram Conflict: Grievances, 
Motivations, and Institutional Resilince in Northeast Nigeria.” CNA. https://www.cna.org/cna_files/pdf/DOP-2014-
U-009272-Final.pdf 
9 Bukarti, Audu. (2015). “The Origins of Boko Haram – And Why it Matters.” Hudson Institute. 
https://www.hudson.org/research/15608-the-origins-of-boko-haram-and-why-it-matters	
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morale in militants to rise up against the local populous and government.10,11 In terms of 
international jihadi organizations’ impact,  ISIS has created the opportunity for Islamic State 
West Africa to threaten Nigeria, West Africa, and possibly the entire continent in ways that Boko 
Haram was never able to do prior to ISWAP’s establishment. 
Mohammed Yusuf was a native of Yobe State, Nigeria. He received a Quranic education, 
and it was during his studies when many scholars believe Yusuf began to expand his radical 
beliefs. Yusuf was a former member of the Islamic Movement of Nigeria and later joined the 
group Ahlus Sunnah wal jama'ah hijra. According to Yusuf’s sons, the September 11, 2001, 
terrorist attacks on the United States, which took place while he was on pilgrimage in Saudi 
Arabia, largely inspired Mohammed Yusuf to broaden his influence through whatever means 
necessary.12 This, in part, is what led to his more aggressive recruitment and intolerance of 
Western ideology propagating across the Maiduguri region in 2002 once Yusuf returned. 
According to analysis published by West Point’s Combating Terrorism Center, the head of 
Ansaru stated that initial funding to found Boko Haram came from individuals connected to al-
Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.13 At this time, Mohammed Yusuf built a religious building in 
Maiduguri that was coupled with an Islamic-principled school. Despite Nigeria’s overall 
economic success at the time, the country suffered from a massive poverty rate. In 2003, the state 
of Jigawa in Northern Nigeria had a poverty rate of 95%, and in 2009 Jigawa’s poverty rate was 
                                                
10 Onuoha, Freedom. (2014). “Why Do Youth Join Boko Haram?” United States Institute of Peace. 
https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR348-Why_do_Youth_Join_Boko_Haram.pdf 
11 Higazi, Adam. (2013). “The origins and transformation of the Boko Haram insurgency in northern Nigeria.” 
CAIRN. https://www.cairn-int.info/article-E_POLAF_130_0137--the-origins-and-transformation-of-the.htm 
12 Bukarti, Audu. (2015). “The Origins of Boko Haram – And Why it Matters.” Hudson Institute. 
https://www.hudson.org/research/15608-the-origins-of-boko-haram-and-why-it-matters 
13 Zenn, Jacob. (2018). “Boko Haram: Beyond the Headlines: Analyses of Africa’s Enduring Insurgency.” 
Combatting Terrorism Center at West Point. https://ctc.usma.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/Boko-Haram-
Beyond-the-Headlines_Chapter-6.pdf 
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89%.14 Yusuf was able to allure poor youth from across Nigeria who were struggling for survival 
in poverty rates like Jigawa’s. He utilized this recruitment to convert their young and to deftly 
sway their minds toward his extremist beliefs.  
As Mohammed Yusuf grew in notoriety, he was selected as the leader of Ahlus Sunnah 
wal Jama'ah. Shortly after Yusuf took leadership, he began to frame Western ideology as the 
epicenter of wickedness. With this deep belief that the proper Muslim way of life had been 
overtaken by iniquitous Western values, it was at this time that Ahlus Sunnah wal jama'ah hijra 
was rebranded and named Jama’atu Ahlus- Sunnah Lidda’Awati Wal Jihad, or Boko Haram, 
with the loose translation meaning of “Western Education is forbidden”.15  
From 2003 to 2009, Boko Haram was primarily focused on isolating itself from the 
temporal society that Yusuf and his followers believed Nigeria to be. In 2009, Nigerian Vice 
President Goodluck Jonathan was serving in President Umaru Yar’Adua’s absence. At this time 
Goodluck Jonathan was a large proponent of launching a counter-terrorism campaign focused on 
suppressing Boko Haram. According to many accounts, the Nigerian security forces were known 
for overstepping legal boundaries and ruling with heavy hands at the time. In July of 2009, 
security forces clashed with Yusuf’s group, leading to the deaths of hundreds of Boko Haram 
militants and the capture of Mohammed Yusuf. The fight ceased with the killing of Mohammed 
Yusuf while in the custody of the Nigerian police.16  
The Nigerian government's decision to kill Muhammed Yusuf without proper trial 
backfired in that this act unintentionally resulted in Yusuf being looked upon as a symbol of 
martyrdom and further drove Boko Haram militants to bring jihad to the Nigerian government. It 
                                                
14 “National Poverty Rates for Nigeria: 2003-04 (Revised) and 2009-10.” National Bureau of Statistics. 
15 Mapping Militant Organizations. “Global Islamic State.” (2019). Stanford University. 
https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/mappingmilitants/profiles/boko-haram#text_block_19380 
16 Nossiter, Adam. (2009). “Nigeria Confirms Death of Islamic Sect’s Leader.” The New York Times. 
https://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/31/world/africa/31nigeria.html 
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was at this time that Boko Haram militants, led by their new leader, Abubakar Shekau, 
temporarily fell into the background and regrouped. Abubakar Shekau, Muhammed Yusuf’s 
former second-in-command (deputy), was then in contact with the leader of al-Qaeda in the 
Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Abdemalek Droukdel, for strategic and financial support. The 
connection was successful and AQIM provided Boko Haram with money, weapons, and 
ammunition to seek revenge for the killing of “the martyr Shaykh Muhammad Yusuf”.17 With 
the tools necessary to begin their offensive, Boko Haram’s domain expanded with Maiduguri 
remaining as the axis.  
Until this time, Boko Haram relations with al-Qaeda were largely speculated without 
much proof. There were talks of communication between the two groups, but nothing of this 
nature that incontestably showed the commitment that AQIM had been willing to dedicate in the 
pursuit of revenge and the slaughter of opposition. 
 The years 2010 to 2015 served as a devastatingly impactful time on Nigeria’s population. 
Ravaged towns and villages led to further economic disparity, socio-political differences, and 
enormous struggles for the local populace solely to survive the threat of attacks each day. Boko 
Haram had pivoted its aims towards combating Nigeria’s political agenda and setting up an 
Islamic Caliphate in the Northeastern region of Borno.18 During these years, Boko Haram 
strengthened its tactics, amplifying sophistication and employing the usage of mass killings 
through methods like man-borne and vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (IEDs). This 
was witnessed on a national scale in August of 2011, when a vehicle-borne suicide bomber 
crashed into the United Nations headquarters in Abuja, killing or injuring over one-hundred 
                                                
17 Esiri, George. (2010). “North Africa Qaeda offers to help Nigerian Muslims.” Reuters. 
https://www.reuters.com/article/ozatp-nigeria-qaeda-muslims-20100201-idAFJOE6100EE20100201  
18 Thurston, Alex. (2016). “The disease is unbelief: Boko Haram’s religious and political worldview.” Brookings. 
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Brookings-Analysis-Paper_Alex-Thurston_Final_Web.pdf 
FACTIONAL INFIGHTING WITHIN BOKO HARAM 
 20 
people.19 Around this same time, the group orchestrated a series of bombing attacks that 
primarily targeted government buildings like police stations and military outposts. Many 
bombings occurring in 2011 were focused on retaliating against the election of Goodluck 
Jonathan as Nigeria’s fourteenth head of state.20 
 
III. The Creation of Ansaru 
Between the years 2011 and 2012, tensions between Abubakar Shekau and Mamman 
Nur, third in command at the time of Yusuf’s death, began to adamantly rise. Shekau believed in 
the slaughter of all who did not turn their backs on Western ideology to follow the ways in which 
he interpreted the Quran. This would include the killing of other Muslims who did not see eye to 
eye with Shekau. Mamman Nur on the other hand, although a malicious terrorist who is believed 
to have orchestrated the 2011 UN bombing in Abuja, adamantly disagreed with the murder of 
fellow Muslims.21 Shekau would also kill members that defected from Boko Haram. According 
to West Point’s Combating Terrorism Center, it was these fundamental disputes which led to 
Mamman Nur and other members breaking apart from Jama’tu Ahlis Sunna Lida’awati wal-
Jihad in order to establish Ansaru.22 Mamman Nur is known to have strong ties to affiliates of al-
Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and other African Jihadi groups.23 This fundamental disagreement 
could have been one of the main drivers in why we later see that Abubakar Shekau’s faction 
                                                
19 Nossiter, Adam and Murray, Senan. (2011). “Suicide Bomber Attacks U.N. Building in Nigeria.” The New York 
Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/27/world/africa/27nigeria.html 
20 Zenn, Jacob. “Leadership Analysis of Boko Haram and Ansaru in Nigeria.” Combating Terrorism Center at West 
Point. https://www.ctc.usma.edu/leadership-analysis-of-boko-haram-and-ansaru-in-nigeria/ 
21 Zenn, Jacob. (2018). “Boko Haram’s Ultra-Extremist Side Resurfaces: From the Execution of Mamman Nur to 
Humanitarian Workers.” The Jamestown Foundation. https://jamestown.org/program/boko-harams-ultra-extremist-
side-resurfaces-from-the-execution-of-mamman-nur-to-humanitarian-workers/ 
22 Zenn, Jacob. “Leadership Analysis of Boko Haram and Ansaru in Nigeria.” Combating Terrorism Center at West 
Point. https://www.ctc.usma.edu/leadership-analysis-of-boko-haram-and-ansaru-in-nigeria/ 
23 Mapping Militant Organizations. “Global Islamic State.” (2019). Stanford University. 
https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/mappingmilitants/profiles/boko-haram#text_block_19380 
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lacked the networking aptitude to continue to fortify alliances with larger Islamic jihadist 
organizations like al-Qaeda and al-Shabab. These organizations could provide technical 
sophistication in the way that Islamic State in West Africa Province (ISWAP) is now thought to 
be successfully managing. 
 
IV. Resemblance of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb 
Many attacks in 2013 resembled AQIM’s markings. Boko Haram showed its ability to 
transform and adapt in malicious ways when militants dressed up in military uniforms and 
blockaded the town of Benisheik, located between Damaturu and Maiduguri in Borno State, 
leading to the shooting and killing of hundreds.24 Furthermore, according to a senior lecturer at 
King’s College London, murders of students as seen at the agriculture college in Yobe state, a 
secondary school in Mamudo, and in Benisheik and Dumba villages shared many similar 
characteristics with attacks perpetrated by AQIM in Algeria.25 Following this, a trend began in 
Nigeria of increased deaths almost each month from 2011 until reaching a pinnacle of death and 
atrocities in 2014. According to the Council of Foreign Relations, deaths per month caused by 
Boko Haram attacks and clashes had reached 3,456 deaths in the month of March 2014 alone.26 
Yet, Boko Haram had still not caught the eye of the West to the extent that it soon would. During 
the following month of April, the infamous kidnapping of 276 Chibok schoolgirls occurred. The 
atrocious kidnapping from the girls’ dormitories in the middle of the night, served as a tipping 
point for the West’s involvement with Nigerian affairs. Also worth mentioning, the 
                                                
24 BBC Staff. (2013). “Nigeria’s Boko Haram unrest: Scores dead in Benisheik raid.” BBC News. 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-24169992 
25 Rueters Staff. (2010). “North Africa Qaeda offers to help Nigerian Muslims.” Reuters. 
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26 Campbell, John. (2020). “Nigeria Security Tracker.” Council on Foreign Relations. 
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internationally trending #BringBackOurGirls campaign shed light and notoriety on the terrorist 
group across the globe. Shortly after, the United States and other NATO allies sent counter-
terrorism and anti-kidnapping specialists to Nigeria in an effort to assist any way possible.27 This 
event was also the beginning of new tensions within Boko Haram. As many of the girls were 
held captive for three years, it shed light on how certain Boko Haram members disagreed with 
Abubakar Shekau’s opinion as to how negotiations and other leadership efforts should have been 
managed.28 At this point in the insurgency, Boko Haram had killed hundreds of students.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
27 Gardner, Frank. (2014). “Nigeria kidnapping: How can foreign teams help?” BCC News. 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-27376720 
28 Zenn, Jacob. (2014). “Boko Haram and the Kidnapping of the Chibok Schoolgirls.” Comabting Terrorism Center 
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Figure 2. Raid on Chibok Girls Secondary School. The sketch above is provided by the U.S. 
Army from its 2017 Threat Tactics Report against Boko Haram demonstrating Boko Haram’s 
plan of action. Utilizing three main teams: security element, support element, and assault 
element, the group was able to breach the government-run secondary school grounds, neutralize 
the Nigerian security elements, and exfiltrate themselves and the 276 girls without any casualties 
of their own. The sketch demonstrates Boko Haram’s ability to apply military precision tactics 
on a facility guarded by armed security. The kidnappings took place during a time in which Boko 
Haram was especially targeting schools due to their teachings of Western education.29,30  
 
                                                
29 U.S. Army. (2017). “U.S. Army Threat Tactics Report: Boko Haram.” Public Intelligence. 
https://publicintelligence.net/us-army-boko-haram/ 
30 BBC Staff. (2017). “Nigeria Chibok abductions: What we know.” BCC News. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-
africa-32299943 
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V. Boko Haram Pledges Allegiance to ISIS 
Boko Haram continued its military campaign against Nigeria in 2015 and at this point 
had expanded its territorial dominance into neighboring countries. Cameroon, Niger, Chad, and 
Mali have all suffered from the group’s incessant wrath. Burning villages, bombing shopping 
malls and other centers, and countering timely government efforts forced militaries into an all-
out tailspin.31 For example, Lake Chad’s whereabouts located in the west of Chad borders Borno 
State, Boko Haram’s launch pad, and is partially responsible for the group’s overspill into the 
country of Chad. While attacks continued at an intensified level in 2015, the affected 
governments worked to mobilize regional security cooperation.  
In March of 2015, Abubakar Shekau is noted as stating, “We announce our allegiance to 
the caliph, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, and will hear and obey in times of difficulty and prosperity.”32 
This alliance marks the date that Boko Haram pledged allegiance to the Islamic State in Iraq and 
Syria, heralding a new era for the group and bringing about many new policy implications for the 
region. The new alliance was anticipated by security analysts around the world, and days after 
Boko Haram’s allegiance, an ISIS spokesperson announced Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi’s acceptance 
of Boko Haram joining the caliphate, declaring the group's expansion into West Africa.33 
The new alliance answered many intelligence questions at the time. Particularly, since 
ISIS and al-Qaeda are rivals on many fronts, the new alliance indicated that Boko Haram’s 
relationship with al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb was at a vulnerable point and that AQIM was 
likely unable to provide Boko Haram with the same benefits that ISIS was able to render. This 
                                                
31 Asfuro-Heim, Patricio and McQuaid, Julia. (2015). “Rethinking the U.S. Approach to Boko Haram.” CNA. 
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32 Muir, Jim. (2015). “Nigeria’s Boko Haram Pledges allegiance to Islamic State.”  BBC News. 
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33 Ogbogu, Jennifer. (2015). “Analysing the Threat of Bok Haram and the ISIS Alliance in Nigeria.” JSTOR. 
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also came at a vital time for Boko Haram’s livelihood, as regional security forces were battling 
the group at a rather successful rate, gaining back territory and towns that had been overtaken in 
the past. Thirdly, this was an important gain for the Islamic State, as it was an added link to their 
“global franchise” initiative, a key piece to its long-term vision that assures the Islamic State has 
influence, even when defeated in Iraq and Syria, as would be seen in the following years. Boko 
Haram, now officially going by the name of Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), 
quickly began to resemble ISIS’s characteristics on and off the battlefield.  
Since the two groups’ inception, beheadings of Christians, more adept usage of social 
media platforms geared towards propaganda videos, and methodically coordinated hard target 
attacks have all provided fear-inducing visuals. In March 2015, just a few days prior to the two 
groups’ alliance being announced to the world, Boko Haram uploaded its first public video, the 
beheadings of two ISWAP members accused of working for the Nigerian government.34 The 
details of the executions shared many similar attributes to the beheadings of Christians and 
journalists in Iraq and Syria carried out by ISIS, including high-definition resolution cameras, 
special effects edits, and the same extremist ideological rhetoric repeated in the video.35 
Furthermore, 2015 marked a time when hard target attacks on Nigerian, Cameroonian, and 
Chadian soldiers were elevated. Strategic ambushes and the ability to foresee where military 
units had established forward operating posts seemed to have hit a new high. This was the point 
at which ISWAP began using drones to gather aerial imagery intelligence. This tactic 
modernized Boko Haram’s ability to launch daytime and nighttime operations with promising 
                                                
34 Joseph, Dan and Seldin, Jeff. (2015). “Boko Haram Beheads Two Accused Spies in Video.” VOA. 
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FACTIONAL INFIGHTING WITHIN BOKO HARAM 
 26 
success.36 It was a tactic seen in Iraq and Syria from ISIS and signaled to the security industry 
that the Islamic State central was indeed aiding ISWAP in training and tactics.  
The increase in hard target attacks on military and police forces seemed to continue to be 
the field of focus as the Islamic State’s ideals soaked into the West African organization’s 
strategic objectives. As the push toward hard target attacks progressed, disputes between 
Abubakar Shekau and ISIS began to rise. Fundamental disputes in ideology and tactics seemed 
to infect the relationship. In 2016, after a little over a year of the marriage of the two groups, 
ISIS declared Abu Musab al-Barnawi the new leader of Islamic State West Africa. Abubakar 
Shekau’s relief of duty came after leaders in other jihadist organizations voiced concerns to al-
Baghdadi about his leadership style.37 
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Chapter 2: Leadership Profiles of Boko Haram  
 
It is important to examine the leadership styles of both current and former Boko Haram leaders. 
Personality characteristics and prior decisions made by a leader provide important insight into: 
 
● A group’s long term vision 
● How a group will plan attacks 
● Who a group will target 
● How a leader reacts under pressure 
● What other organizations a group may align itself with  
● What type of followers a group attracts 
● Who a group leader will take orders or advice from 
● How a group can best be combated 
● Whether negotiations are on the table 
● Who and what type of future leadership the group may endorse  
 
Little is known about most of the upper-level members within Boko Haram, as many use 
multiple names. However, Abubakar Shekau has persisted long enough for information to be 
gathered on him based primarily from his decisions as the leader of Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna for 
over a decade, though not from first-hand accounts.  
Abu Musab al-Barnawi falls into a different category in that while he has existed in Boko 
Haram for a long time, he was not spotlighted as a leader until recent years. Therefore, the 
characterization of Abu Musab al-Barnawi is primarily based on what we know from his 
upbringing and how he led Islamic State West Africa as the spokesman in 2015 and as the 
commander from 2016 to 2019.  
The remainder of this chapter will discuss specific leaders of Boko Haram. Leaders have 
an ability to influence history, but it is important to highlight that in the story of Boko Haram, the 
overall economic and political situations have an instrumental influence. As the following 
leadership profiles are presented, it is imporntant to consider the role of the actor versus the stage 
on which they are set.  
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I. Abubakar Shekau 
 
 
Leader: 2009-2016 
Age: Unknown, estimated 45-55 years old 
Hometown: Shekau (Tarmuwa district), Yobe State 
Languages spoken: Hausa, Fulani, Arabic, English 
 
 
Left Home at an Early Age 
 
According to an interview with Dalmata Abubakar, Shekau’s mother, Abubakar Shekau 
left his village in Yobe State around the age of fifteen to become an almajiri. An almajiri, or in 
Arabic “al-Muhajirun,” refers to someone who leaves his hometown to study Islam. In Shekau’s 
case, Maiduguri became his place of study. It was here in Maiduguri where he met Mohammed 
Yusuf and began to become ingrained with Mohammed’s Islamic teachings. According to the 
interview, Shekau is not close with his parents, as his father is dead and his mother has not seen 
him in over 17 years.38 The fact that Shekau left home at an early age to become an al-Muhajirun 
is not significant in itself, but there is a common trend within Boko Haram ranks that many 
leaders follow the path of the al-Muhajirun by leaving home at an early age to begin their 
journeys of being menteed into the radicalist beleifs that dwell within West African terrorist 
organizations. Recognizing this trend bolsters counter-terrorism forces capabilities and exposes 
an area to focus efforts of de-radicalization towards potential Boko Haram memebers that are at 
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extremely high-risk to being influenced and recruited. In this case, the current course suggests 
the majority of al-Muhajirun seekers tend to travel to Maiduguri and other impoversished cities 
in and around Borno State.  
An Elusive Actor 
It is a commonly known fault of the Nigerian government to make claims without ample 
evidence to back the statement when discussing Boko Haram matters. Following true to this 
belief, the Nigerian government has claimed it has killed Abubakar Shekau on multiple 
occasions. In July of 2009, the Nigerian government reported that Shekau was killed during a 
firefight with the Nigerian military. Yet, Shekau was seen in a video recording stating he had 
been shot and was no doubt still alive. Similar instances occurred in 2013, 2014, 2015 and again 
in 2016 when the Nigerian Air Force reported they had neutralized the leader during an 
airstrike.39 The many firefights in which he was purported to be caught suggests he is at times on 
the frontlines with his men, but the elusiveness which surrounds him and his ability to stay one 
step ahead of the Nigerian government indicates his tradecraft intellect.  
Attracting Hardline Followers 
Given his dedicated group of followers and since Shekau heavily recruited soldiers from 
the Northeast Borno region- the very place he and his men have terrorized for years- he likely 
has the ability to recruit persuasively when necessary.  He has been said to be highly 
knowledgeable on the Quran, just as Muhammed Yusuf was.40 Of certainty is the fact that 
Abubakar Shekau is not merciful. His ruthless atrocities and lack of respect toward human 
existence demonstrates the belief that he is superior to all other walks of life. Businessmen, 
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teachers, men, women, children, Christians, and even Muslims have died by his hand. Shekau’s 
method of massacring whole villages and kidnapping girls as slaves negates any belief that his 
path is in any way holy. Accounts of suicide bombers with babies strapped to their backs, 
thoughts that seem unimaginable to most of the world, occurred under Shekau’s terror.41  
Takes a Takfirist Approach 
The bombings of Mosques and the enslavement of Muslim women are pieces of what 
heavily set Shekau apart from al-Barnawi and other Islamic State-backed leaders. Shekau’s 
opposition to the multiplicity of Imams, or having more than one leader, is said to be another 
fundamental discrepancy that has led to many fallouts with other jihadist organizations. Shekau’s 
clear inability to empathize based on his brutal tactics against civilians, security forces, and his 
own members show his unpredictability.42  
Ill-Tempered Disposition 
 On many accounts, Shekau has been observed as ostensibly angered. His rage was 
largely noted when Shekau has delt with the Nigerian government or braodcasted videos 
referencing Western ideology; however, Shekau further demonstrated his temper and 
disagreeableness when he was ejected as leader of ISWAP by ISIS caliph Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. 
Shekau’s denial of having been succeeded by Abu Musab al-Barnawi and his claim that he was 
still in control proved his lack of ability to adjust in his form of thinking and deal with the 
demands of other organizational leaders.43 This inability to acquiesce carried over when 
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negotiating with government officials during the long and drawn-out Chibok kidnapping 
negotiations.  
 These personality traits may be why he is no longer recognized by the Islamic State, as 
well as the main factor that led to the separation of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb from Boko 
Haram. It appears that when al-Qaeda did not provide Shekau with what he needed, the leader 
quickly re-aligned his loyalties to ISIS. The same image seemed to resurface when Shekau was 
no longer the ISIS-desired “caliph” of ISWAP, as he angrily left and proclaimed himself as the 
leader of the JAS faction, boldly marking the two as unequally yoked.  
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II. Abu Musab al-Barnawi (Habib Yusuf) 
 
Leader: 2016-2019 
Age: Late 20’s to Mid 30’s 
Hometown: Borno State, Nigeria 
Languages Spoken: Suspected Hausa, Arabic, Fulani, English  
 
 
ISWAP Likely Saw Deep Allegiance 
Abu Musab al-Barnawi was the former spokesperson for Boko Haram. More 
significantly, al-Barnawi was the son of Boko Haram founder Mohammed Yusuf.44 The Islamic 
State having selected the son of the founder of Boko Haram to lead the group can by no means 
be chalked up to coincidence. It was believed that al-Barnawi shared many of the same principles 
as his father. As someone who has been committed to the jihadist cause, and more importantly 
someone that has a deep emotional and personal connection to the founding of Boko Haram, al-
Barnawi was a candidate that likely showed the necessary skills capable of maintaining a 
strategic plan, designing an attainable multi-year vision, and staying loyal to the ISWAP 
allegiance.  
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Non-Takfirist Approach  
According to the Islamic State’s newspaper, al-Barnawi is quoted as stating that Boko 
Haram does not endorse attacks on mosques or the killing of Muslims.45 With this, he has been 
considered too lenient by group members that left ISWAP to follow Shekau in his separation. In 
2018, ISWAP released a book that was said to be written by al-Barnawi and another one of 
Yusuf’s sons. According to Jacob Zenn, an assistant professor at Georgetown University’s 
Security Studies program and a fellow at the Jamestown Foundation, the book focuses heavily on 
why the faction rejects Abubakar Shekau’s excessive methods of killing, particularly using 
children as suicide bombers and the killing of fellow Muslims.46 
More Cooperative Than His Predecessor   
The move could also have been considered a potential effort by al-Barnawi and ISIS to 
rejoin forces with the Ansaru faction, abandoning Shekau’s rule with “too extreme” methods. 
The book even mentioned restoring Ansaru militants back into ISWAP in order to help defeat 
fighters that were still loyal to Shekau after his defection.47 The timing of al-Barnawi’s 
promotion seemed to have occurred when Boko Haram was desperate for a revival. It can be 
concluded that the demotion of Abubakar Shekau was potentially a non-negotiable deal in 
keeping ISIS’s support during a time when the group was constantly on the run from Nigerian 
military offensives. 
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Rule with Heavy Hand Persists  
 It is important to point out that while Abu Musab al-Barnawi may not have been 
considered as hardline an extremist as his former leader, he is by all terms of the word, a 
terrorist, whose sole focus was to wage jihad against all who did not conform. Al-Barnawi made 
multiple statements through the Islamic State’s news outlet and through ISWAP propaganda 
videos that showed his continued commitment to eradicate all non-Muslims through shootings, 
bombings, and any other method of killing.48 This has led to the dismantling of Western ideology 
in the region.  
Steered ISWAP in the Islamic State’s Intended Direction 
After the leadership change, the Islamic State loudly broadcasted their disputes with 
Shekau. This was largely because Islamic State main was aware of the new impression ISWAP 
would need to make on the Muslim crowds in Nigeria so that ISWAP could truly establish a 
caliphate in Borno State. ISWAP’s heavy focus on military attacks instead of soft targets backs 
this belief. Political opposition talks were enhanced on all fronts of Islamic State media.49 
Lastly, while under al-Barnawi’s rule, ISWAP would routinely propagandize its hard 
target successes against the militaries of Nigeria, Chad, Cameroon, and Niger. This would later 
show that ISWAP under al-Barnawi’s reign was more concerned about the big picture of 
expanding ISIS across West Africa, rather than Shekau’s domain that was largely confined to the 
Sambisa Forest.50 
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III. Restructuring of ISWAP Leadership  
Abu Mus’ab al-Barnawi was replaced by Abu Abdullah Idrisa bin Umar Albarnawi, 
otherwise referred to as Ba Idrisa, as the new Wali of ISWAP in March of 2019. The two are not 
suspected of having any relation to one another, despite having the same last name. The decision 
to change leadership was made by ISIS caliph, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.51  
With the structural shift arose questions of whether al-Barnawi would reject Ba Idrisa’s 
appointment just as Shekau did in 2016. These events differ greatly from the leadership change 
between Abubakar Shekau and al-Barnawi as the caliphate in Syria and Iraq was bolstered by a 
stable foundation of 30,000 fighters in 2016. While in 2019, the Islamic State was on the run 
with only remnants of the so-called caliphate left in the region.52  
In reference to al-Barnawi’s response to the change, he would have understandably seen 
the change as a possibility, having taken part in Shekau’s removal. More importantly, al-Barnawi 
was in power when the execution of Mamman Nur took place. Many researchers speculated that 
Mamman Nur was actually the brains of the Boko Haram operation even when Mohammed 
Yusuf was still alive. Bulama Bukarti, an analyst at the Tony Blair Institute for Global Change 
who translated an audio recording of ISWA press release, claimed that Mamman Nur desired to 
be the leader of ISWA and disputed al-Barnawi’s abilities to lead the group.53 According to the 
Council on Foreign Relations, the translated audio recording presented three reasons for 
Mamman Nur’s demise. The first attempts to sabotage al-Barnawi’s rule, the second is back-
channel negotiations with the government, and the third is an attempt to defect from ISWAP and 
turn himself into the Nigerian government, risking severe sabotage. This is an important finding 
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as it provides an understanding of events that would sculpt al-Barnawi’s form of thinking when 
he, too, became exiled in terms of no longer being the faction’s leader. Seeing that he recognized 
and played a forceful hand in the way Shekau and Nur were treated when they were no longer 
desired, he would have known that any pushback would have likely led to his becoming entirely 
exiled or even executed.  
 
Figure 3. 54 Internal ISWAP Communication. The passage above represents a translation of 
the audio recording that one of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi’s clerics was said to have broadcasted 
across Islamic State communication channels.  While the reasoning behind this shift is unclear, it 
may have been part of a broader leadership restructuring effort across Islamic State-affiliated 
groups in anticipation of what was to come in post-caliphate times.  
                                                
54 Kelly, Fergus. (2019). “Islamic State enforced leadership change in West Africa province audio reveals.” The 
Defense Post. https://www.thedefensepost.com/2019/03/15/new-islamic-state-west-africa-leader-audio-nigeria/ 
“I am announcing to my mujahideen brothers, commanders, and leaders in the Islamic State 
West African Province that the commander of the believers has deposed Abū Musʿab al-
Barnāwī as the Governor. 
 
“He has been replaced by Shaykh Mujahid Abū Abdīllah Idris bin ʿUmar also known as Ibn 
ʿUmar al-Barnāwī. 
  
“Together with my brothers in the consultative council, we are announcing to you our 
hearing and obedience of the command from the Commander of the believers and we are 
giving our full allegiance to the newly chosen Governor imposed on us by the Commander of 
the believers. 
 
“And we are saying to him, you should lead us on the commands of Allah. We are the people 
that listen and obey. There is no one that will disobey you among us. Even if anyone disobeys 
you, we will all converge with you against him as long as you did not command us to disobey 
Allah. 
 
“Allah can bear witness for our testimony. At this juncture, I am announcing to my brothers 
in the entire province that they should follow the footsteps of their leaders in the consultative 
council and give their hearing and obedience to the new Governor. We are praying to God to 
help and guide him. In the end, I am reminding all my brothers that the deposition and 
replacement of a Governor in the caliphate is not a new phenomenon that started today.” 
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According to The Jamestown Foundation, Islamic State in the Greater Sahara was 
restructured under Islamic State West Africa Province in March 2019, and a new “Central Africa 
Province'' was established in April of 2019, with both actions taking place around al-Barnawi’s 
March demotion.55 Al-Barnawi was said to have been demoted but still serving on the shura 
council, and possibly in charge of the group’s media outlet. The shift in leadership did bring 
about factional infighting and reportedly led to some of al-Barnawi supporters leaving the group 
to start a separate faction wedded with Ansaru members in the Northwest. This faction later 
migrated their camp back to the Lake Chad region near ISWAP headquarters.56 
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Chapter 3: Challenges Amid Success 
I. Impactful Propaganda 
Many claims have been made that Boko Haram was dead and defeated after regional 
militaries stepped up attacks in 2016. These claims come from Western news outlets as well as 
local governments. The Nigerian President, Muhammadu Buhari, stated in 2015 that the group 
had been “technically defeated” and again in 2018 he stated, “We have since beaten Boko 
Haram.”57 These claims were quickly proven wrong by more attacks in the Northeastern region 
and were largely considered political propaganda from President Buhari, as he was focused on 
his re-election.  
Recent years have included many high profile attacks, which have fallen in line with the 
Islamic State’s goals in the region. BBC News reported Nigerian soldiers claiming to have more 
advanced drones than seen in the previous years.58 The head of U.S. Africa Command (Africom), 
General Stephen Townsend, stated in 2019 that ISWAP was far more dangerous than Boko 
Haram’s other factions. The General also mentioned an increase in numbers due to the Islamic 
State establishing recruiting methods specifically focused on increasing the number of  foreign 
fighters in Nigeria.59 In 2019, the New York Times released an article showing evidence that 
Islamic State West Africa was in control of four of Borno State’s ten zones.60 At the same time, 
the Nigerian military pulled its troops back from forward outposts due to lack of advancement, 
retreating back to camps that have been reinforced and designed to protect civilians against 
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militant attacks. The retreat led to ISWAP having full territorial control over the rural region, as 
well as a major offensive. According to John Cambell of Nigeria’s security tracker, the Nigerian 
military thought they would be able to launch attacks from the camps. Instead, ISWAP continued 
to have success with military ambushes, deterring patrols that extended far past the new base 
camps’ securities.61  
Through the Islamic State West Africa Province’s revolutionized strategic military 
decisions, the group has threatened West Africa with a much more long-term dynamic than 
previous events have suggested. ISWAP now overruns towns in Borno State. Instead of killing 
the villagers as previously seen with Shekau’s faction, the group announces to the village that it 
is not there for them, but rather just the “infidels.” Infidels, in this context, is primarily referring 
to the military. ISWAP often allows villagers to stay in harmony under their rule or flee if they 
so choose.62 The group has been noted to be building wells, passing out farming necessities, and 
providing safe passage for farmers and herders. According to an interview conducted by the 
news agency Reuters with a herder in the Lake Chad region, Islamic State West Africa does not 
harm herders, drivers, or traders as long as you follow their laws. Rather, they only harm security 
personnel.63 This holistic approach aids in boosting the local economy and provides an opening 
to raise taxes. Islamic preachers are used in the recruitment of new members, local herders, and 
farmers. Additional populace has been used to gather intelligence about incoming military 
attacks, and new checkpoints were constructed to ensure unwanted guests are kept out.   
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These strategic tactics allow ISWAP to gain territory and project a new facade toward 
civilians. It also inevitably allows the group to gain far more followers as it is seen as an 
opposition group working to combat the “corrupt” government’s political agenda instead of a 
terrorist group with a takfirist position. Although relations between Islamic State West Africa 
and Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna are oftentimes unclear, ISWAP in certain territories has actually 
offered sanctuary from Boko Haram’s JAS faction, further splitting the groups similarities. This 
is a fascinating progression as the Islamic State is known to utilize the exploitation of 
humanitarian crises or a failed state as means of strengthening the group and expanding its 
domain. Once embedded, the group will offer support to the local issues at hand. This approach 
demonstrates the Islamic State’s ability to intellectually adapt to new circumstances. It would 
mean that the Islamic State attached to Boko Haram to then exploit both the original terrorist 
group and the crisis taking place in the country in order to establish its new faction away from 
Shekau's reach.64  
 
II. Implications of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi’s Death 
ISIS is a battle-hardened force that grew in its militaristic capabilities and ideological 
propaganda attractiveness through years of experience fighting in the Middle East. As the defeat 
of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria unrolled, starting in 2016 and destroying the last pocket in 
Syria in 2019, ISIS needed its worldwide subdivisions and allies more than ever. 65 
It is difficult to tell whether the majority of influence ISIS had on ISWAP was more 
ideological versus strategic, but one thing is certain- the Islamic State provided Boko Haram the 
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tools necessary to maintain its influence. We know that Boko Haram’s tactics on the battlefield 
became more calculated and hard target-centered after the two groups’ union. The Islamic State 
was providing ISWAP with training and funding in the beginning, but it is hard to tell where the 
relationship has solidified in more recent years. It seems as if monetary support had declined  
instinct with the slow diminution of ISIS in Syria, but ideological support stayed on a similar 
path as before.66  
The death of the Islamic State caliph, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, raised a plethora of 
questions surrounding the implications that his demise posed for ISWAP and other groups that 
formally pledged allegiance to ISIS.67 Al-Baghdadi, who was killed by U.S. forces in Syria in 
October of 2019, was said to be in contact with Boko Haram on many occasions beginning in 
2016. So close, that according to the Institute for Security Studies, the Islamic State caliph 
ordered the execution of Mamman Nur in 2018.68 ISWAP serves as the largest Islamic State 
affiliate in all of Africa with an estimated 3,500 to 5,000 group members.69,70 Therefore, while it 
was already vital to the livelihood of Islamic State influence in Africa prior to the leader’s 
murder, it was all the more imperative when the existence of ISIS became threatened by 
metaphorically cutting the head off the snake. Since al-Baghdadi’s death, two events have taken 
place that could sculpt the battlefields of West Africa for better or for worse. First is the possible 
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reintegration of al-Qaeda’s hand in Nigerian affairs. The second is structural leadership changes 
in ISWAP which bring about many new questions for the group’s future in the Lake Chad Basin. 
 
III. Threat of al-Qaeda Re-emergence in Nigeria 
Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was killed in Idlib, a city in northwest Syria that has been 
destabilized from excessive regional fighting over the past decade, leading to a massive 
humanitarian crisis. Idlib is a deep pocket for al-Qaeda linked fighters to seek safe haven. When 
al-Baghdadi was hiding out in Idlib, al-Qaeda offshoot Hayat Tahrir al Sham was estimated to 
have around 20,000 fighters still controlling the province.71 It was speculated at the time of al-
Baghdadi’s death that he was perhaps in the Idlib region not only hiding but also trying to recruit 
from within al-Qaeda’s ranks.72 ISIS and al-Qaeda oftentimes carried on ideological and 
territorial disputes, and many ISIS fighters originally came from the ranks of al-Qaeda and its 
affiliates. One of the most important questions that remains to be answered is whether fighters 
that have not already returned to al-Qaeda will do so in the midst of chaos in their own group. A 
high-level member of the Shabaab al-Mujahideen Movement, al-Qaeda’s Somalian affiliate, 
called out to ISIS fighters in hopes of their return to al-Qaeda. The man, who goes by the alias 
Adel Amin, asked ISIS members to reconsider returning to the path of “righteousness” and 
joining groups with allegiance to al-Qaeda.73,74 Although al-Qaeda and ISIS are at times ripe 
with disputes, the groups hate Western ideology far more than they dislike each other.  
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Specifically for the Lake Chad Basin, it is estimated that 10,000 jihadist foreign fighters 
came from the West Africa region to fight in Iraq and Syria.75 Where will the remaining fighters 
go now that ISIS no longer has a stronghold in Syria and al-Baghdadi is dead? They may join 
Islamic State affiliates like ISWAP or Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS), or members 
might turn to a host of al-Qaeda affiliates in the district. Since al-Qaeda was once active in 
Nigeria, it is not unrealistic to expect al-Qaeda to return to Nigeria as ISWAP could look to 
realign its vision with that of their Jihadi brothers.  
Ansaru’s bouts with other Boko Haram factions were considered to be centralized around 
Abubakar Shekau’s malicious actions towards other Muslims; therefore, there may not be 
anything stopping ISWAP and Ansaru from aiding one another. Afterall, reports of fighters 
abandoning their own faction to defect to another have continually surfaced since the factional 
splits first occurred. As previously discussed, the link between Ansaru and al-Qaeda in the 
Islamic Maghreb has been evident for years.76 The most significant fact is that Ansaru, after 
more than six years of dormancy, re-upped its active status in October 2019, the very same 
month that Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was killed.77 Following this, Ansaru took responsibility for an 
attack in Kaduna State in Northwest Nigeria that claimed the lives of seven men. The attack, 
which occurred on January 17, 2020, hit a vehicle convoy containing political and security 
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personnel along with the Emir of Potiskum, Yobe State.78 Ansaru’s part in the attack was 
publicly declared through al-Qaeda’s al-Hijrah media outlet.79 This attack gives validity to the 
theory that al-Qaeda and Ansaru may be attempting to take advantage of Islamic State’s 
recruiting lull, forming new coalitions, and amplifying attacks in order to maximize its 
broadcasted activity through propaganda apertures.  
 
IV. A Hardline Takeover 
Abu Abdullah Idrisa bin Umar Albarnawi remained a character few knew much about 
throughout his time as group commander. His placement as leader of ISWAP was established by 
the consultative council, and he was said to hold similar ideological standards as his predecessor. 
According to the Premium Times, ISWAP members wanted to begin a new campaign 
spotlighting members that chose to abandon ISWAP and live in peace. Ba Idrisa apparently 
denied this action, as he recognized that it would lead to the execution of the former members. 
He was claimed to have led with too weak of a hand, not punishing townspeople that were 
suspected of reporting information to opposing forces.80 In response to Ba Idrisa being called too 
soft, he was overthrown. Reports vary, but Ba Idrisa and his cabinet, composed of Mohammad 
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Bashir, Mustapha Jere, Ali Abdullahi, and Baba Mayinta, may have been killed when group 
members loyal to Ba Idrisa attempted 
to free them.81  
This hardline takeover could 
perhaps be connected to Islamic State 
main pushing members to seek revenge 
for the death of caliph Abu Bakr al-
Baghdadi and the Islamic State’s 
spokesperson, Abu al-Hassan al-
Muhajir, who was killed just one day 
after al-Baghdadi.82 Since al-
Baghdadi’s death, many killings have 
taken place, particularly focused on revenge for the attack and execution of Christians across the 
country. Information Minister Lai Mohammed believes Islamist groups are attempting to, 
“trigger a religious war and throw the nation into chaos.”83 Just one day after Christmas, eleven 
Christians were murdered, ten of them having their throats slit and an eleventh shot to death. 
“Those who you see in front of us are Christians, and we will shed their blood as revenge for the 
two dignified sheikhs, the caliph of the Muslims, and the spokesman for the Islamic State, 
Sheikh Abu al-Hassan al-Muhajir, may Allah accept them,” declares the Islamic State 
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propaganda video that streamed the murders of the eleven Christians, who were blindfolded with 
restraints.84 Following the executions, a Christian pastor was beheaded and a Nigerian church 
torched, leaving more than two dozen dead in the central Nigerian state of Plateau.85 These 
unfortunate actions show that ISWAP is expanding into regions it previously avoided in an effort 
to inflict harm upon Christians. Figure 4 above shows the divide between the Nigerian states that 
have adopted Sharia Law and states that have not.86  
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Chapter 4: How A Terrorist Group Ends 
I. Comparison of Organizational Structures 
The organizational structure of ISWAP is designed quite similarly to that of ISIS and al-
Qaeda. ISIS, for example, has a leader (caliph Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Qurashi) and the 
leader is backed by a shura council that supports the leader but also has the power to dethrone the 
caliph.87 ISWAP’s structure is largely the same, consisting of a leader and a shura council that 
support the group’s leader but can replace him if they see necessary. This organizational shift has 
not always been in place for Boko Haram and was only implemented when Abubakar Shekau 
was ejected from ISWAP.  The adoption of organizational structure ensures a more democratic, 
equal balance in power, and it safeguards the group from exploding into anarchy at the sudden 
death of a leader. This is only partly applicable to the recent leadership changes since it was a 
complete takeover of both the caliph position and the consultative council, instead of a 
nonviolent restructure made by the shura council as was seen during the shift from Abu Musab 
al-Barnawi to Ba Idrisa in 2019. Another important consideration, at least at the current time, is 
that ISWAP appears to still be in direct communication with ISIS central. This is significant in 
that ISIS can still provide guidance on future strategic decisions.  
The new leader of the Islamic State faction is suspected to be Lawan Abubakar.88 
Although Boko Haram has survived leadership changes before- Mohammed Yusuf, Abubakar 
Shekau, Abu Musab al-Barnawi, Ba Idrisa- the turnover in leadership is far more disparate than 
ever before. A Boko Haram leader, no matter the faction, has never reportedly killed off his 
predecessor or as has been reported, his entire shura council. At the moment, the fact that the 
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new leader has enough followers to stage a successful coup is the only concrete information open 
source intelligence provides.  
 
II. Assessing Network Resiliency  
Research performed by Jenna Jordan, associate professor at the Sam Nunn School of 
International Affairs, suggests that a terrorist network’s resilience is based primarily off of two 
factors: 1) bureaucratization and 2) communal support.89 Osama Bin Laden, Abu Musab al-
Zarqawi, and Abu Yahya al-Libi are but a few examples of high-level al-Qaeda leaders that the 
United States terminated in counter-terrorism operations. Despite the many successful targeted 
killings of al-Qaeda leaders that the United States has conducted, the group still thrives today. 
The dual-pronged approach that Jordan suggests would mean that al-Qaeda had enough 
decentralization and organized sub-leadership positions in order for the group to sustain and 
adapt in response to an upper-level hit. It would also translate that al-Qaeda was heavily resilient 
due to the fact that it is a transnational organization with a large host of supporters willing to aid 
the cause.  
Kathleen Carley’s 1991 “A Theory of Group Stability” proclaims that a group with a 
more decentralized organizational structure has a far better chance withstanding the loss of 
leaders than a group that is entrenched in a hierarchical leadership design.90 Applying this theory 
to al-Qaeda gives an unusual outcome. How did al-Qaeda prove to be so resilient if its structure 
is that of a hierarchical style? Although al-Qaeda has a hierarchical leadership anatomy within its 
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organization, the group has not been known to directly manage day to day operations of its many 
factions, thus putting more power in the hands of sub-level leaders.91  
When applying both Jenna Jordan’s and Kathleen Carley’s theories to examining Islamic 
State West Africa’s resilience as a terrorist organization, it can be recognized that ISWAP does 
contain a certain level of bureaucratization as its leader is supported and held accountable by 
four members making up the shura council, each of whom is in charge of a different division.92 
The sub-levels continue within military units (waterborne, ground, artillery operations), but are 
not as established as al-Qaeda’s surplus of units, based upon the literature that exists. Rather, 
ISWAP would be more equivalent to just one of al-Qaeda’s factions. From a communal 
standpoint, ISWAP has gained heavy influence in recent years and has a much larger support 
group than Abubakar Shekau’s faction. ISWAP also has the popularity of Islamic State to bolster 
its support. In terms of hierarchy and revisiting ISWAP’s recently instituted shura council, 
ISWAP’s efforts to make the group a more democratically functioning society will likely boost 
its ability to defend against sudden changes. 
Implications of sudden leadership shifts can appear in many different forms. In Audrey 
Cronin’s study “How al-Qaida Ends”, the author presents key factors that have led to past 
terrorist groups’ decline or change in nature. Some examples that may fit closely with Boko 
Haram include: the loss of a leader, an unsuccessful generational transition, and a terror group’s 
transformation into a political group.93 The change in leadership could actually be a major 
driving factor in all three of these outcomes and more. Boko Haram has increasingly had 
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younger leaders since ISWAP forced Abubakar Shekau out. It is inevitable that the group will be 
approaching a generational shift as Muhammed Yusuf began gathering his original followers for 
the group around the year 2002.94 Generational turnover could eventually lead to a lack in 
foundational group knowledge, a diminished sense of belonging than felt before, and even 
contribute to a loss in motivation and vision.  
The shift in perception of a group from terrorist organization to political entity often 
signals a group has the characteristics necessary for longevity. Hamas provides a strong example 
of this trend. It was deemed a Foreign Terrorist Organization by the United States in 1997, yet 
Hamas won the Palestinian legislative elections in 2006 and assumed control over parts of the 
Gaza Strip and West Bank.95 Prior to its leadership change, it appeared that ISWAP had become 
heavily ingrained in the rural villages of Northeast Nigeria, collecting taxes, enforcing Sharia 
law, and providing livelihood necessities to civilians. This push largely demonstrates ISWAP’s 
interest in advancing their political sway and popularity in the region with strong similarities to 
historic actions of Hamas.  
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Chapter 5: Applied Analysis 
The majority of information that has been presented through the course of this research 
can be interpreted many different ways. Below are two examples of interpretations of the recent 
leadership changes within Islamic State West Africa based on analysis that has been presented 
throughout the paper.   
The “so what” or “why” of the first report is most significant to security forces of 
Nigeria, Niger, Chad, and Cameroon in that it can help governments best prepare for an uptick 
in violence that in many ways could mimic attacks witnessed in 2014 and 2015.  
The second example is based on the “multiple scenario outcomes” technique. A brief 
summary of possible outcomes due to the recent leadership shift from Abu Abdullah Idrisa bin 
Umar Albarnawi to Lawan Abubakar is presented. These scenarios are just three examples of 
possible outcomes and are not all-encompassing possibilities. The outcomes focus on leadership 
alignments and not on battlefield impact. 
Lastly, I will discuss the application of Fjilde and Nilssons’ work on the factors that 
increase the likelihood of violence between rebel groups, in this case between factions of Boko 
Haram.  
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I. Bottom Line: 
ISWAP: Internal Execution of Ba Idrisa Likely to De-rail Operational Track 
The execution of Abu Abdullah Idrisa bin Umar Albarnawi, known briefly as Ba Idrisa, 
could very likely be seen as a hardline takeover. The group has expressed animosity toward 
the level of intensity with which Ba Idrisa has enforced Sharia Law throughout the Lake 
Chad region. It is almost certain that this shift from moderate to hardline leadership will 
result in continued intensification of hard and soft target attacks. Islamic State West Africa 
Province has been active under its current name since 2015, primarily in Northeast Nigeria’s 
Borno State and surrounding borders of the Lake Chad Basin. Leadership changes have occurred 
multiple times throughout the group’s inception, which has led to the creation of sub-factions. 
● In February of 2020, Ba Idrisa and four members of his consultative council were killed 
during a coup, according to the Premium Times.96 
● According to Al Jazeera News, ninety-two Chadian soldiers were killed in an attack 
launched by Boko Haram in the Boma peninsula in March of 2020. The attack marks the 
deadliest attack on Chad soldiers since Boko Haram’s birth in 2009.97  
● In March of 2020, ISWAP abducted four women in Niger during two attacks. Abductions 
of Muslim women were previously not seen under the leadership of Ba Idrisa, according 
to the Jamestown Foundation.98  
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Factional infighting is not unique in its own nature when reflecting on the groups’ origins; 
however, the hardline takeover is almost certainly an after effect of Islamic State of Iraq 
and Syria calling upon ISWAP to seek revenge for the recent deaths of Islamic State Caliph 
Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and Abu al-Hassan al-Muhajir, Islamic State’s head spokesperson.  
In October of 2019, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was killed when U.S. special operations forces 
conducted a raid to capture Baghdadi in Syria’s Idlib province. One day later, Abu al-Hassan al-
Muhajir was killed by a CIA air strike in Northwest Syria. After the assassination of the two 
leaders, ISIS called upon its affiliates to seek revenge for the leaders’ deaths against the infidels.  
● According to Reuters news, ISIS swore vengeance for the death of its Caliph in an audio 
recording that was uploaded online just a few days after the death of al-Baghdadi.99 
● In Nigeria, ISWA executed ten Christians on Christmas day by slitting their throats. They 
credited the killings to revenge for the death of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and Abu al-Hassan 
al-Muhajir, according to the New York Times.100 
● In January of 2020, ISWAP abducted two Christian students that were studying at the 
University of Maiduguri. A young boy was later seen executing the twenty-two year-olds 
after stating the execution was revenge for bloodshed perpetrated by Christians.101 
I assess that the execution of Ba Idrisa and takeover by Lawan Abubakar will almost 
certainly lead to an increased number of soft and hard target attacks. This will likely be 
focused towards Christians and security forces. The takeover suggests that while attacks 
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were taking place, they were not at the magnitude that ISIS leadership or many ISWA 
group members were content with. The events also demonstrate a perceived lack of Sharia 
Law enforcement. Leadership takeovers have happened in the past but not in the form of a coup 
that ended with multiple executions. This is an almost certain indicator that the new leadership 
will quickly get its affairs in order and launch aggressive attacks. 
● Based on previous attacks and the current battlefield layout, militants will likely focus 
their efforts on attacking security forces located in “super camps” in Northeast Nigeria 
that have a strategic disadvantage to ISWAP’s rural countryside hideouts. 
● Christians will continue to be targeted in the middle belt of Nigeria, and attacks on 
mission stations and churches that serve pockets of Christians in the North are also very 
likely to be targeted. 
● Due to the hardline shift, it is possible that we see a realignment of sorts between 
Abubakar Shekau’s JAS faction and Islamic State West Africa to increase the success of 
hard target attacks toward Lake Chad Basin military forces. 
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II. Multiple Scenarios Analysis  
Scenario #1:  
The first scenario is that ISWAP chooses to realign with Abubakar Shekau’s faction in 
order to amp up success against hard target strikes. If this happens, we will likely see Shekau’s 
influence spread back into ISWAP. Abubakar Shekau was expelled from the group because of 
his hardline approach which included the abduction of Muslims. We now see a circumstance 
where ISIS is likely willing to relax certain ideals in order to advance overall jihad which is most 
important to ISIS at the time in order to prove they have not been defeated following al-
Baghdadi’s demise.  
The Shekau-like approach is supported by the March 2020 abductions of four Muslim 
women during attacks in Niger that were carried out by ISWAP.102 Even in this scenario, it is 
very unlikely Shekau will be brought back as the leader of ISWAP. As mentioned in previous 
analysis, this was not done prior to the month that the leadership change occurred. Since the 
group is still believed to be in communication with ISIS, it does not need JAS for funding, 
training, or guidance. Instead, ISWAP will use Shekau’s faction solely for manpower during 
hard target attacks to expand its reach across the Lake Chad region. 
Scenario #2:  
A second scenario is that the group loses communication with ISIS main. This could 
occur for a number of reasons, such as: 1) ISIS did not agree with the execution of Ba Idrisa and, 
thus, has lost control over the group, 2) ISIS is not able to provide ISWAP with the desired 
ideological, financial, or strategic support, or 3) al-Qaeda, through Ansaru and AQIM, gains a 
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foothold in the Northwest and can offer ISWAP more direct support than ISIS central is able to 
in its current state. 
If communication with ISIS main is lost, it will likely lead to one of two possible new 
alliances: 1) ISWAP pledges its allegiance to al-Qaeda and gains back Ansaru and any new 
AQIM members that have migrated. As discussed above, the whole reason Ansaru and ISWAP 
are separate today heavily falls on their allegiances to rival terrorist organizations. In the end, 
both groups desire the same outcome, a caliphate in West Africa and jihad against infidels. 2) 
ISWAP aligns with JAS and, in this case, could actually re-incorporate Abubakar Shekau as the 
leader of both ISWAP and JAS. Abubakar has far more notoriety than any of the members 
affiliated with the recent coup against Ba Idrisa. Therefore, during a time when all prior 
leadership has been killed off and ISIS is no longer available for guidance, the group may turn to 
the only leader left that they know has the experience and grit to lead Boko Haram in Nigeria for 
more than a decade.  
Scenario #3:  
A final scenario for ISWAP is that the group takes a hybrid response to the hardline 
takeover. The execution of an entire shura council has never been seen before within Boko 
Haram. Many of Ba Idrisa’s followers disagree with the actions taken to overthrow the leader. 
Due to this, we could see defectors that will either start their own sub-faction, defect to Ansaru, 
or join JAS. The remaining group will continue on with the hardline approach under the new 
leader’s guidance.   
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III. Violence Between Non-State Actors 
Fighting between factions of Boko Haram represent conflict between non-state actors. In  
their 2012 study, Fjield and Nilsson sought to determine why rebel groups find value in fighting 
other rebels and other non-state actors.103  Using quantitative analysis of data on armed conflict 
between non-state actors from 1989 to 2007, they identified multiple factors that increased the 
likelihood of these inter-rebel conflicts. Some of these factors apply in the case of Boko Haram 
and its conflicts that are not with state actors. Specifically, the two factors that apply in the case 
of Boko Haram are control of territory beyond governement reach and a weak state authority in 
the region. The political and geographic factors in which Boko Haram is situated mean that they 
are mainly located in areas where national goverments have poor control. Additionally, citizens 
in the regions where Boko Haram is found have weak allegiances to their national governements 
and those governments have relatively weak authority in the reigons.  
 
IV. Indicators  
Looking ahead, funding could be one of the most important indicators for understanding 
what direction the current leadership will lean. For example, in terms of finances, Boko Haram 
has a plethora of resources that it has tapped into in the past. External funding (first seen from al-
Qaeda and now seen from ISIS), bank robberies, extortion in the form of collecting taxes and 
protection fees, the trafficking of drugs and weapons, and stealing weapons from the Nigerian 
military are all successful financing tactics that have been used in the past by both JAS and 
ISWAP. A largely known tactic that has been utilized by Boko Haram is kidnap and ransom 
                                                
103 Fjelde, Hanne & Nilsson, Desirée. (2012). “Rebels against Rebels: Explaining Violence between Rebel Groups.” 
Journal of Conflict Resolution.  
 
FACTIONAL INFIGHTING WITHIN BOKO HARAM 
 58 
(K&R) negotiations with governments.104 Particularly for ISWAP, watching to see if the faction 
enhances K&R operations, whether the prisoners are released or executed, and whether 
operations are being conducted on the Muslim population could serve as a major indicator that 
the group is trending away from its prior values of not harming its fellow brothers and sisters in 
Islam.  
 
V. An Opportunity to Exploit ISIS 
Of significant interest to the U.S. defense sector is the fact that Islamic State West Africa 
is still believed to be in heavy communication with Islamic State central. On both sides new 
leadership exists. If there was ever a time to exploit group members within an organization, it 
would be while this infighting is taking place, making members far more likely to turn against 
each other. Secondly, a restructure of leadership means that an organization's regular methods of 
communication, routine, and order have been disrupted. This, in hopes, leads to an insouciant 
demeanor toward operational security loopholes. 
Ten days after the events of 9/11, President George W. Bush shared with the American 
people the following words: “We have seen their kind before. They are the heirs of all the 
murderous ideologies of the 20th century. By sacrificing human life to serve their radical 
visions—by abandoning every value except the will to power—they follow in the path of 
fascism, and Nazism, and totalitarianism. And they will follow that path all the way, to where it 
ends: in history’s unmarked grave of discarded lies.”105 The passage supports that terrorism is 
not a new methodological form of suppressing the innocent, but rather it is an old tactic that has 
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risen and fallen many times before. The United States harbors the knowledge of the inner 
workings of terror groups. The nation understands the structure of terror from its leadership to 
the underlying conditions that laid the groundwork for a vacuum of susceptibility in an 
environment. Thus, the U.S. has the strategic skills, technical know-how, and operational means 
to properly utilize the infighting within Islamic State West Africa and the timing of Abu Bakr al-
Baghdadi’s death.  
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Chapter 6: Policy & Accountability 
This paper seeks to understand the impact of factional infighting within Boko Haram for 
the purpose of creating positive dialogue in the conversation of advancing counter-terrorism 
efforts. Since it is a security-centered paper, I will only be stating U.S. policy goals in the region, 
and I will address the state of the U.S. defense sector in West Africa solely and specifically in 
reference to its fight against Boko Haram. This is done in an effort to give the reader a holistic 
understanding of the current situation. Therefore, the writing does not address what the United 
States is doing to combat other threats in the region, nor will I be recommending what U.S. 
policy goals should be or forming policy proposals in reference to the United States. This 
research is centered on stating my interpretation of what open source intelligence suggests is 
occurring within the organizational structure of Boko Haram and the events that could 
potentially unfold in the future. However, in an effort to contribute to a much needed dialogue, I 
will address efforts that need to continue by the Nigerian government for deterring future violent 
extremism in the region. 
 
I. U.S. Policy Goals in Nigeria 
According to the State Department, Nigeria is the single most important strategic partner 
for the United States in sub-Saharan Africa.106 Nigeria is one of Africa’s most politically 
influential countries, referred to as “the largest democracy in Africa” by President Trump in 
2018.107 The country serves as Africa’s largest oil producer and has allegedly surpassed South 
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Africa as the largest economy on the continent.108 In 2018, Nigeria was the United States’ second 
largest trading partner in Africa.109   
From the American policy perspective, Washington’s relations with Abuja have been 
healthy for the past two decades. The election of President Buhari in 2015 helped to minimize 
any issues that arose during President Goodluck Jonathan’s leadership regarding unfair 
elections.110 Looking ahead, President Trump has expressed interest in expanding Nigeria’s 
bilateral trade relationship with the United States. Nigeria's significance will only continue to 
increase as its population is expected to be ranked number three in the world, surpassing the 
United States by the year 2047.111    
U.S. military and diplomatic first-line goals in Nigeria are sighted on protecting the 
United States from cross-border security and health hazards, advancing trade relations, and 
supporting development toward stability and self-reliance.112 From a counter-terrorism 
perspective, the U.S. is focused on securing its borders from transnational threats stemming from 
Boko Haram and Islamic State West Africa, as well as ensuring that Nigeria has the ability and 
assistance required to diminish terrorism activity and allow for the successful return of displaced 
persons. Collectively, these efforts help to combat underlying terrorism stability and expansion 
issues.  
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II. U.S. Defense Activity in West Africa 
The United States has heavily weighed cutting back on troop activity in West Africa, but 
the constant threat of terrorism has only increased in the region. U.S. military objectives in West 
Africa have changed in recent years from aiming to diminish terrorist organization’s recruitment 
and impact to focusing primarily on containing terrorist activity to its current level.113 A large 
portion of U.S. military action in efforts to combat Boko Haram is carried out in Niger, Chad, 
and Cameroon. This is primarily seen in the form of Intelligence, Surveillance, and 
Reconnaissance (ISR) support, airstrikes, information sharing, and allied forces training.114 In 
addition, U.S. Africa Command instructs courses at the Nigerian Defense Intelligence College in 
Abuja, Nigeria. In 2020, U.S. AFRICOM instructors graduated 20 West African female 
intelligence officers in an effort to enhance force multipliers.115 
The United States has strayed away from supporting the Nigerian military in direct 
counter-terrorism efforts largely due to corruption and human rights violations that have riddled 
Nigerian security forces for years. Abuses perpetrated by security forces have included torture, 
extra-judicial killings, airstrikes mistaking displacement camps for Boko Haram hideouts, and 
other war crimes that regularly go without fair accountability measures.116 However, the United 
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States does provide boots on the ground in training capacities and security specialists as seen in 
2014 in response to the Chibok girls’ kidnapping.117  
Cameroon and Chad fall on a similar playing field. The United States has soldiers based 
at the Cameroonian Air Force Base in Garoua that focus on ISR support to the Multinational 
Joint Task Force.118 In Chad, U.S. forces operate a drone base that also relies on ISR capabilities 
targeting Boko Haram militants in Nigeria.119 The base is located in N’Djamena, the capital of 
Chad, which is positioned on the side of the country bordering Northeast Nigeria. 
The U.S. Air Force has a drone air base located in Agadez, Niger, that houses fighter jets 
and armed drones capable of conducting surveillance and striking enemy combatants in West 
Africa. Additionally, the U.S. gave the Niger army its C2 Node, an operations and 
communications control center, to help combat against Boko Haram militants.120 The death of 
four Green Berets in Niger during a 2017 battle with Islamic State affiliates led to soldiers being 
forced to scale back ground operations in the country to some extent.121 Although the U.S. is 
only in the area in a support capacity, AFRICOM was forced to declassify and release a map that 
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exposed interim outposts in Africa due to the Freedom of Information Act. The map displayed 
temporary bases in the Arlit, Dirkou, Diffa, and Ouallam areas of Niger in 2019.122  
At the end of the day, the United States’ goal in West Africa is to ensure American 
security and to promote U.S. interests. The United States and other Western counterparts like 
France and the U.K., two of West Africa’s largest Western-based support allies, can only aid the 
Lake Chad countries so much in combating Boko Haram. It is up to Nigeria and its neighbors to 
play their vital roles in stopping terrorist expansion.  
 
III. Analysis of Nigerian Efforts to Combat Boko Haram 
President Buhari was elected in 2015 against serious opposition on the platform that he 
would diminish terrorism, combat corruption, and ease poverty matters, but he has fallen short 
thus far. In terms of direct military action, Buhari relocated the military's central command 
station from the capital to the heart of Boko Haram affairs in Maiduguri.123 His previous 
experience as a top level military official played a vital part in his electoral support. These efforts 
were strategically valuable, but Boko Haram cannot be deterred through combat alone. As 
demonstrated in my research, Islamic State West Africa continued to engage with and overpower 
security forces leading to forward outpost retreats and loss of control over Borno’s countryside. 
Efforts to gain back this territory must be brought to the top of priorities if Nigeria seeks to claim 
that they are playing their part in the Lake Chad Task Force.  
Pervasive acts of corruption by the government and human rights violations by security 
forces have poisoned the country with distrust and animosity towards the government, and this 
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has not seemed to improve during Buhari’s leadership. In 2016, it is estimated that Nigerian 
officials were bribed in excess of $4.6 billion in the one year alone.124 Transparency has lacked 
in the country for years. Accounts of military and presidential claims that Boko Haram is on the 
run, defeated, nearing its demise, or any other false glimmer of hope to help enhance political 
appeal must halt with complete repudiation in order to regain the public trust.  
Operation Safe Corridor, an effort geared toward the deradicalization of prior Boko 
Haram militants, began in 2015, and is without any doubt a step in the direction toward 
deescalating the country’s hardships. Although the program focuses on areas that include 
religious education, psychosocial therapy, and reintegration efforts, the program is unequally 
balanced and needs to expand partnerships with businesses to enhance job opportunities. One 
issue that ails the current effort is the lack of desire projected by Nigeria’s populace after being 
tormented by Boko Haram for years. Additionally, the program falls short in addressing 
defectors that rank highly in Boko Haram’s command structures. Facing this issue is vital in that 
upper-level combatants could provide critical information to hasten the downfall of Boko Haram. 
This does not mean forgoing justice or accountability, but clear-sighted policy must be in place 
to deal with Boko Haram members at all levels who choose to defect from the organization.  
Youth exploitation programs must also be enhanced, especially in areas like Maiduguri 
where many leave home at a young age in an attempt to grow in their understanding of the 
Quran. This can be approached from multiple angles but must prioritize proper religious 
education and support self-interpretation. It also must direct efforts toward combating illiteracy, 
especially in regions with exceedingly high poverty rates. The World Bank estimated that the 
North accounted for almost 87% of all Nigerians considered poor in 2016, also citing that 
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poverty reduction has been less effective compared to its West African neighbors, regardless of 
overall economic growth.125 Utilizing former Boko Haram members that have been integrated 
back into society as first-hand accounts to counter youth manipulation is one method of 
continuing to pursue gains in the midst of unfavorable circumstances.  
Lastly, the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) must see to it that the work is 
continued in equal weight. In 2019, AFRICOM held its annual Lake Chad Region Intelligence 
Workshop. The central discussion was centered around intelligence operations integration.126 
Signs point that the MNJTF is working in the right direction and seeking to grow in areas that 
will keep their countries a step ahead of the enemy. The Director of Intelligence for the task 
force is Colonel Ayuba Baningo of Nigeria, yet Chad has been cited numerous times stating that 
Nigeria is not doing their part in combating threats. Nigeria, Chad, Cameroon, Niger, and Benin 
need to utilize the Multinational Joint Task Force as a true frontline platform for holding each 
other accountable and ensuring that each country’s military is working not only maintain its 
current standing, but striving to enhance its current methods of operation, code of conduct, and 
transparency. This multinational military and intelligence collaboration are a true key to 
combating Boko Haram’s grip on the region.  
 
IV. Conclusion 
Nigeria and its neighbors in West Africa are a long way from erasing the underlying 
systemic issues that led to the rise of Boko Haram and which truthfully have only worsened since 
Boko Haram’s campaign imploded the Lake Chad region over a decade ago. Internally displaced 
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persons have reached over 2.2 million in Nigeria, and external displacement has forced the 
migration of thousands into neighboring Chad, Niger, and Cameroon.127 The people of West 
Africa are tired of being cursed with the misfortune of warped ideology and pseudo-
transformational leadership, and they are weary of Boko Haram’s killings, kidnapping, and 
infliction of destitution. However, while researching Nigeria’s hardships through open-source 
scouring of published research documents, news articles, video media content, twitter feeds, 
terrorist propaganda, think tank conferences and more, I encountered multiple sources of content 
that displayed how Nigeria’s people are fighting on. Nigerians are living their lives despite the 
atrocities taking place. A study in 2019, conducted by World Values scientists out of the United 
Kingdom, suggested that the happiest people in the world live in Nigeria, proof of a people 
taking an optimistic look at their future despite the challenges and suffering a large portion of the 
nation faces.128  
Stopping the spread of terrorism takes a multipronged approach, and through support 
from the West, accountability among West African neighbors, and the continuation of open 
dialogue by academic institutions surrounding these detrimental security issues, there is a path to 
combat Boko Haram in West Africa. 
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